Neo-conservatism, hardcore
A very dangerous Perle at Bush's side.
to the original in the Asian Times
By Jim Lobe
WASHINGTON - If hardcore neo-conservatives Richard Perle and David Frum had
their way, the Bush administration would be issuing ultimatums on virtually
a daily basis.
In their new book, An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror, Perle, the
well-connected former chairman of the Defense Policy Board, and Frum, a former
White House speechwriter, call for the administration to, among many other
things:
* Actively promote, presumably through direct action, the secession of the
oil-rich eastern province of Saudi Arabia, unless the Saudi government provides
its "utmost cooperation in the war on terror."
* Cut off the flow of oil (from Iraq) and arms supplies to Syria, and pursue
suspected "terrorists" into its territory, unless Damascus implements
a thoroughgoing "Western reorientation" of its policies, economy
and political system.
* Prepare to launch preemptive strikes against North Korea's nuclear facilities
(although "we do not know where all these facilities are"), unless
Pyongyang "immediately surrenders all of its nuclear material, closes
its missile bases and agrees to the permanent presence of international inspectors".
* Explicitly reject the jurisdiction of the United Nations Charter, unless
it is amended to accommodate Washington's new strategic doctrine of "preemption".
* Help "dissidents" overthrow the government of Iran - "the
regime must go".
In what they call a "manual for victory", the two authors, both
resident fellows at the American Enterprise Institute, describe an extremely
dangerous world in which the greatest current evil, "militant Islam",
can be found everywhere - from "Indonesia to Indiana" (not to mention
"in some remoter areas of Venezuela", Paraguay, Brazil and northern
Nigeria) ... The stakes could not be higher.
Militant Islam "seeks to overthrow our civilization and remake the nations
of the West into Islamic societies imposing on the whole world its religion
and law", write the authors.
Nor do such ambitions represent only a tiny minority of Muslims, as US President
George W Bush himself has contended. The militants' goals command wide support
among Muslims worldwide, including in the United States, where the "loyalty"
of US Muslims requires special scrutiny by law enforcement and their fellow
citizens, according to Perle and Frum. "The roots of Muslim rage are
to be found in Islam itself," they write. "There is no middle way
for Americans," they warn. "It is victory or holocaust."
If all this sounds a little terrifying, it is because Perle and Frum are deeply
concerned that the administration's determination - and that of the country
as a whole - to wage the "war on terror" to its bitter end is flagging.
"We can feel the will to win ebbing in Washington; we sense the reversion
to the bad old habits of complacency and denial."
This book, then, is designed to re-energize the effort, and must be taken
seriously because it no doubt echoes arguments that are currently being made
at the highest levels of the Bush administration. While Frum, who allegedly
coined the phrase "axis of evil" linking Iraq to Iran and North
Korea in Bush's 2002 State of the Union address, is known more for his rhetoric
than his foreign-policy expertise, Perle has been a fixture of the national-security
policy scene for more than 30 years.
Known as the "Prince of Darkness" for his opposition to arms-control
agreements with the Soviet Union as a senior Pentagon official under former
president Ronald Reagan, he has been one of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz's best friends since 1969, as well as the mentor of Douglas Feith,
the ultra-Zionist under secretary of defense whose office oversaw preparations
for the Iraq invasion and the postwar occupation.
A longtime ally of both Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Vice President
Dick Cheney, Perle was described by the Washington Post last year as the "intellectual
guru of the hardline neo-conservative movement in foreign policy", who
enjoys "profound influence over Bush policies". it is thus safe
to say that Perle's views count, and the fact that he believed already in
October - when the book (published by Random House) went to print - that the
administration was losing its zeal is significant.
Perle and Frum naturally blame the State Department, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), retired military officers and senior officials from the administration
of the current president's father - in other words, all the foreign-policy
specialists and "realists" who initially raised questions about
going to war in Iraq - for resisting their calls for expanding the war to
Syria, Iran, North Korea and even Saudi Arabia.
And they categorically reject, albeit often defensively, any notion that the
loss in momentum might be due more to over-optimistic predictions by themselves
and their friends in the offices of Cheney and Rumsfeld about the ease with
which US forces could occupy Iraq without significant international support.
More than once, they insist that if only the White House had installed their
hero, Iraqi National Congress chief Ahmad Chalabi, as president of a provisional
government before the invasion, all would be well today. "Seldom has
the foreign-policy bureaucracy inflicted such shameful damage on American
interests than in its opposition to working with Saddam [Hussein]'s Iraqi
opponents," they write.
But the authors fail to note that since he was virtually carried to Baghdad
on the shoulders of the invading US forces, Chalabi's main power base does
not appear to have expanded much beyond his US-trained militia and his friends
back in the Pentagon.
Indeed, a persistent theme in the book is that if Washington really prevails
in the "war on terror", it will be no thanks to the bureaucrats
who run the State Department and the CIA, whose apparatchiks are "blinded
by the squeamishness that many liberal-minded people feel about noticing the
dark side of Third World cultures".
Hence, CIA director George Tenet "has failed. He should go," while
"we should increase sharply the number of political appointees in the
State Department and expand their role". Such measures should ease adoption
of the neo-conservatives' agenda, which includes not only ultimatums but also
simple directives, such as:
* Work fastidiously to isolate France from the rest of Europe while doing
"our utmost to preserve our British ally's strategic independence from
[emphasis added] Europe", in part by offering UK arms manufacturers preferential
treatment, and promoting an Anglo-American defense condominium that would
also include Australia and Canada.
* Forge a defense partnership "with Japan, Australia, and other willing
Asian democracies as intimate and enduring as the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] alliance. China should know that any attempt to bully any of
its democratic neighbors will be resisted by all of them - no ifs, buts or
exceptions."
* "Cease criticizing Israel for taking actions against Hamas and Hezbollah
(or similar groups) analogous to those the United States is taking against
al-Qaeda. The distinction between Islamic terrorism against Israel, on the
one hand, and Islamic terrorism against the United States and Europe, on the
other, cannot be sustained."
* Avoid turning Iraq into a "ward of the United Nations or the 'international
community'," because "once the international bureaucrats get their
hands on society, they never let go".
This last point is illustrated by a curious list of countries, including Cambodia
and Somalia, where the authors apparently believe - mistakenly - that the
United Nations remains in charge.
That is one of a striking number of factual errors, illustrating either the
haste with which the book, which even lacks an index, was put together, or
simple ignorance on the part of the authors. They contend, for example, that
"Saudi-inspired extremists" launched wars against Christian communities
on Indonesia's Sulawesi and Maluku islands, when they are apparently referring
to Laskar Jihad, a militia that most experts believe was not only inspired
but armed by elements in Indonesia's military.
Frum and Perle make similar assumptions about the indigenous insurgency in
Indonesia's Aceh province and what are predominantly ethnic, rather than religious,
clashes in northern Nigeria. Indeed, much as they invariably attributed Soviet
aggression to various nationalist, ethnic and reformist movements during the
Cold War, Perle and Frum now seem determined to find a "militant Muslim"
and/or Saudi-Wahhabi hand in conflicts or terrorism from Mindanao to Lake
Maracaibo.
And just as in the Cold War, they appear to prefer authoritarian to democratic
regimes if the latter risks empowering Islamic radicals, as they make clear
in yet another directive: "In the Middle East, democratization does not
mean calling immediate elections and then living with whatever happens next,"
they write.
"That was tried in Algeria in 1995 [sic], and it would have brought the
Islamic extremists to power as the only available alternative to the corrupt
status quo. Democratization means opening political spaces in which Middle
Eastern people can express concrete grievances in ways that bring action to
improve their lives."
While the authors stress that democratization also requires protecting minorities
and women, the message that comes through is that democracy is not their highest
priority, the neo-conservatives' frequent protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.
It is clear from recent events - particularly Bush's criticism of Taiwan,
his tentative feelers toward Iran, and his warm words for Libya ("an
implacably hostile regime", according to the authors), as well as the
acceleration of the transition timetable in Iraq - that the neo-cons' influence
has waned further in the months since the book was sent to print.
No surprise, really: after watching Bush's poll numbers plummet as US casualties
rose beginning last summer, the president's political adviser Karl Rove reportedly
issued a directive of his own several months ago: "No war in '04,"
an election year.
The neo-cons might be down but they are most certainly not out. They and their
administration allies, notably Cheney, have shown that they retain sufficient
influence for now to prevent any major softening in the hard lines on North
Korea and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
If Bush wins a second term with Cheney at his side, neo-conservatives such
as Perle might well find themselves back on top. If so, you may be able to
buy this book on remainder and use it as a scorecard.
(For excerpts from An End to Evil: How to Win the War on Terror, go
via foot of article link here .)
(Inter Press Service)
Also see our Fair Use Policy under which this is reproduced on home page.
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| ______________________________________ | June 30, 2004 |
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